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‘This eternal wanderer’: A non-dogmatic reading of Saussure 
John E. Joseph, University of Edinburgh 
 
Abstract: Ferdinand de Saussure’s Cours de linguistique générale (1916) has been widely received as a 
dogmatic text, putting forward a reductivist conception of the language system. Yet there are grounds for 
reading it very differently, as Roman Jakobson (1969) did when writing of Saussure’s “dynamic repugnance 
toward the ‘vanity’ of any ‘definitive thought’”. Henri Meschonnic (1932-2009) blamed ‘structuralists’ (a label 
which, of course, gets applied to Jakobson himself) for turning Saussure’s linguistics of the continuous into a 
dogmatic “scientism of the discontinuous”. Meschonnic’s list of structuralist distortions of Saussure is the 
framework for the argument presented here in favour of a non-dogmatic reading of the Cours. 
 
Keywords: Ferdinand de Saussure, structural linguistics, Roman Jakobson, Henri Meschonnic, langue and 
parole, syntagmatic and associative axes, synchrony and diacrony, iconicity 
 
This paper owes a double debt to the Prague Linguistic Circle. The main title comes 
from Roman Jakobson (1896-1982), and the subtitle from an insightful remark by James 
Underhill of the Université de Rouen, following the Circle’s 90th anniversary symposium in 
October 2016. Commenting on the papers given there and their authors, Underhill got to 
“John the Prophet Joseph who makes the Spirit of Saussure into Flesh and blood without the 
dogmatism”. It had not occurred to me before, but yes indeed, much of what puzzles me 
when people talk about Saussure having set this or that limitation on language or linguistics 
comes down to their reading the Cours de linguistique générale (Saussure 1916) as dogmatic. 
I have always read it instead as Jakobson did, when he wrote of Saussure: 
But perhaps the genuine greatness of this eternal wanderer and pathfinder lies precisely 
in his dynamic repugnance toward the “vanity” of any “definitive thought”. Then, the 
vacillation of his terms and concepts, the outspoken doubts, open questions, 
divergences and contradictions between his diverse writings and lectures within any 
single draft or course appear to be a vital constituent of an anxious seeking and restless 
striving as well as of his essentially multilateral view of language. (Jakobson 1969: 8)  
It is a list of all the scholarly foibles we are taught to avoid, offered as a paradoxical account 
of Saussure’s paradoxical greatness. Yet how often we hear linguists, semioticians, literary 
scholars and others proclaim their discovery that language extends beyond the limits imposed 
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by Saussure’s dogmatic reductionism, which supposedly aims to contain all of language 
within a rigid structure of arbitrary signs. 
Another linguist who read Saussure as non-dogmatic, Henri Meschonnic (1932-2009), 
was severely critical of the ‘structuralists’ whom he blamed for distorting Saussure’s 
teaching. Meschonnic (2009: 20) lists nine points on which structuralists believed they were 
following Saussure but were in fact contradicting him. It is these structuralist contradictions 
that he contends have passed into general culture and been misunderstood as what Saussure 
taught. His list offers a good framework for explaining the non-dogmatic reading of Saussure 
which I endorse. Meschonnic’s first three points concern how Saussure conceived of the 
language system: 
1. when Saussure says system, a dynamic notion, structuralism says structure, a formal 
and ahistorical notion; 
2. when Saussure proposes that with language all we have are points of view – a crucial 
notion: representations – structuralism with the sign presents itself as describing the 
nature of language; 
3. and Saussure constructs the notion of point of view according to an entirely deductive 
(rational-logical) internal systematicity, whereas structuralism created descriptive 
(empirical) sciences of language[.]1 
These are all profound insights. The first two testify directly to the openness of vision in the 
Cours. Meschonnic is right, I believe, to point the finger at a structuralism that ironically 
includes Jakobson as one of its key figures; but he ought to have left some room for people 
such as Émile Benveniste (1902-1976), who get classified as structuralists despite their 
having distanced themselves from their contemporaries on some of these key points. As for 
                                                          
1 “1. quand Saussure dit système, notion dynamique, le structuralisme dit structure, notion formelle et 
ahistorique; 2. quand Saussure pose que sur le langage on n’a que des points de vue, notion capitale: des 
représentations, le structuralisme avec le signe se présente comme décrivant la nature du langage; 3. et Saussure 
construit la notion de point de vue selon une systématicité interne toute déductive, mais le structuralisme a fait 
des sciences du langage descriptives”. 
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the third point, I expect most linguists would consider a deductive approach to be more 
dogmatic than a descriptive one. Here though the ‘descriptive’ of 3 connects with its 
etymological doublet ‘describing’ in 2, where ‘describing the nature of language’ is placed in 
opposition to ‘points of view’. I read Meschonnic here as giving a version of Householder’s 
(1951) God’s truth vs. hocus-pocus contrast, in which some structural linguists purport to 
discover and describe an objectively determinable structure, whereas others, like Saussure, 
see the system and the account of it as jointly constructed. Meschonnic seems to be calling in 
point 3 for ‘de-binarising’ the descriptive and the deductive, but his compact wording may 
make it sound as though he is instead trying to shore up the dichotomy. He wants to remind 
us that all deduction needs to start from description of some sort, and that ‘pure’ description 
is a utopian ideal. Or maybe dystopian. 
Meschonnic’s next two points are about the relationship of langue and parole: 
4. and Saussure thinks the unity of langue and parole, language and speech, in 
discourse, but structuralism disjoined as two heterogenous entities a linguistics of 
langue and a linguistics of parole; 
5. also, in Saussure, the theory of language postulates and presupposes a poetics, 
whereas structuralism only managed to oppose the rationalism of the Cours to the 
madness of his notebooks on anagrams[.]2 
                                                          
2 “4. et Saussure pense l’unité de la langue et de la parole, dans le discours, mais le structuralisme a disjoint 
comme deux hétérogènes une linguistique de la langue et une linguistique de la parole; 5. aussi, chez Saussure, 
la théorie du langage postule et suppose une poétique, mais le structuralisme n’a su qu’opposer le rationalisme 
du Cours et la folie des anagrammes”. As is well known, Saussure (1916) was put together posthumously by his 
colleagues Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye from his manuscript notes and the notebooks of students who 
attended his lectures at the University of Geneva. The Cours contains the essence though not the whole of 
Saussure’s teaching, hence Meschonnic’s remark in (5). The 99 notebooks that record his search for hidden 
anagrams in poems, mainly in Latin but also in Homer, became known through articles by Jean Starobinski 
starting in 1964, and culminating in Starobinski (1971). The anagrams took the form of a key word, the theme of 
the poem or the name of its dedicatee, chopped up and rearranged within the poem following certain regularly 
recurring principles. Ultimately he could not establish definitively that the anagrams were created intentionally 
and were not the product of chance, and so he abandoned the project. When his notebooks on the subject came 
to light in the early 1960s, they were interpreted as showing Saussure’s lack of faith in his own principle of the 
linearity of the signifier, since an anagram is a signifier in non-linear order. However, linearity is an attribute of 
signifiers in the langue as Saussure conceives it; the poetic anagrams are a part of texts at the level of parole, 
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Anyone who claims that for Saussure the whole of language is contained in langue, the 
language system, has not read the Cours very carefully. The central problem it is wrestling 
with is how language can be systematic enough to function socially and yet be open to 
endless individual innovation, creation and expression. In the first course Saussure calls 
langue the individual side of language, and parole the social, which seems intuitively right 
since parole, speech, is how social interaction takes place. But he was still finding his path, 
and by the second course he has reversed himself: henceforth it is langue that is socially 
shared, and in parole that all our individuality is manifested. 
Nor did he marginalise parole. He envisioned a linguistics of parole that would be 
parallel to the linguistics of langue that he was pursuing as a first step. Here the editors did 
not help matters by coming up with that final sentence of the Cours, which has no counterpart 
in the source materials: “linguistics has as its unique and veritable object language [la 
langue] envisaged in itself and for itself”.3 It comes just after a paragraph in which Saussure 
distances himself from those who maintain that the “genius of a race” leads its language in 
certain deterministic directions; and indeed Saussure consistently rejects racial or ethnic 
determinism, quite dogmatically. In that sense, linguistics should be concerned with the 
language alone rather than with racial psychology, as developments in German linguistics in 
the 1930s would bear out. But not with langue as distinct from parole, which amongst other 
things is where all language change is generated. Diachronic enquiry is always in the 
background of Saussure’s thinking, except when it is at the fore. 
 Point 6 is about the syntagmatic and associative axes: 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
individual production. There is no inherent contradiction between the linearity of the signifier in langue and the 
existence of anagrams in parole. 
3 “la linguistique a pour unique et véritable objet la langue envisagée en elle-même et pour elle-même”. 
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6. and Saussure, as even the text of 1916 shows, opposes the associative, which is 
multiple, to the syntagm, when structuralism managed only to practise the binary 
opposition of the paradigmatic to the syntagmatic[.]4 
 In the 1930s, the Danish structural linguist Louis Hjelmslev (1899-1965) rechristened 
Saussure’s ‘associative’ axis as the ‘paradigmatic’ axis (see Koerner 2000: 126n.), implying, 
for Meschonnic, a closed paradigm, as opposed to an indefinite web of associations. Noam 
Chomsky, another arch-structuralist (in my admittedly minority view, laid out in Joseph 
2002), would attack 
Saussure’s conception of langue as an inventory of elements […] and his preoccupation 
with systems of elements rather than the systems of rules which were the focus of 
attention in traditional grammar and in the general linguistics of Humboldt. (Chomsky 
1964: 23)  
The second part of this is false: “rules” in Chomsky’s sense are found neither in traditional 
grammar nor in Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835).5 But what Chomsky says about langue 
being an inventory of elements, which would exclude syntax, is not obviously wrong. Indeed 
it is widely believed that a great weakness of the Cours is to have dogmatically relegated 
syntax to parole. Various passages describe a language as a trésor (a set of valuables or a box 
or pouch for storing them), a dépôt, a somme, a magasin, in the brain of each of its speakers. 
                                                          
4 “6. et Saussure, ce que montre même le texte de 1916, oppose l’associatif, qui est multiple, au syntagme, 
quand le structuralisme n’a su que pratiquer l’opposition binaire du paradigmatique au syntagmatique”.  
5 Consider the prototypical Chomskyan “rule” S → NP + VP. Certainly S, NP, and VP are elements. As for 
what the rule consists of, Chomsky always leans toward treating rules as instructions for constructing 
derivations. (Constrains like the Binding Theory and the Empty Category Principle of GB were a departure, 
ultimately abandoned.) When he spells out rules informally in English they are given as imperatives, like a 
recipe: rewrite X as Y; Move α; Merge. In that sense, no “traditional grammar” ever had a “rule”. Note also that 
McCawley (1968) gave specific arguments for interpreting S → NP + VP as what he called a “node 
admissibility condition”, i.e., as simply a licence for an element consisting of a small subtree with S at the top 
and NP VP along the bottom.  A well-formed tree under that conception is simply a system of such elements, 
related via their shared node labels. That makes context-free phrase structure grammar look much more like the 
Saussurean “system of elements” Chomsky is rejecting. In short, if what counts as rules for Chomsky are indeed 
rules for constructing derivations, as he has always maintained, they have no counterpart in traditional grammar 
or in Humboldt. If instead rules are interpreted as McCawley suggests, the sharp contrast between rules and 
systems of elements dissolves. 
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Although it never says inventaire, “inventory” is a reasonable equivalent for the other terms. 
But an inventory of what? In its discussion of analogy the Cours says: 
Every analogical creation must be preceded by an unconscious comparison of the 
materials deposited in the trésor of the langue where the generating forms are arranged 
according to their syntagmatic and associative relations.6 
Forms arranged according to their syntagmatic and associative relations is much more than an 
inventory. If it is a system of elements, those elements include the grammar, and all the 
“rules” whereby the elements relate to one another both virtually (in associative relations) 
and through their syntagmatic combinations. No dogmatic exclusion of syntax from langue, 
then; no reduction of the language to an inventory of elements, conceived in opposition to 
rules. Instead, a flexibility as to where to draw the line between syntactic significations that 
are part of the langue, and where individuals have the freedom to combine in parole. 
Meschonnic’s Point 7 concerns arbitrariness: 
7. and for Saussure the radical arbitrariness of the sign implies a radical historicity of 
language, of languages, of discourses (when we seek the origin we find the 
functioning), but in structuralism arbitrariness was understood as a 
conventionalism[.]7 
We can expand on this to note that the Cours includes a substantial discussion of “relative 
arbitrariness”, in which Saussure recognises that the whole systematic nature of langue 
implies limits to the arbitrary. And although he dismisses cases of onomatopoeia as not being 
so directly imitative as they appear, the fact is that onomatopoeia inheres not within the 
linguistic sign, but in the relationship between a sign and a thing-in-the-world. Saussure did 
                                                          
6 CLG 2 227: “Toute création doit être précédée d’une comparaison inconsciente des matériaux déposés dans le 
trésor de la langue où les formes génératrices sont rangées selon leurs rapports syntagmatiques et associatifs”. 
See further Joseph (2014).  
7 “7. et chez Saussure le radicalement arbitraire du signe implique une historicité radicale du langage, des 
langues, des discours (quand on cherche l’origine on trouve le fonctionnement), mais dans le structuralisme 
l’arbitraire a été compris comme un conventionnalisme”. 
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not deny that such relations exist, but considered their analysis to lie outside linguistics, 
hence beyond his competence to discuss. For example, to identify the Chinese words miao 
and mao as onomatopoeic is to posit a link between, on the one hand, the sonic realisation of 
a signifier and a sound-in-the-world (a cat’s meow), and on the other, a signified (“cat”) and 
the thing-in-the-world that makes the sound. But the arbitrariness principle applies within the 
sign. It succeeds in signifying regardless of whether a particular speaker or hearer perceives 
the onomatopoeia (see Joseph 2015).  
Similarly with synaesthesia: Saussure himself was deeply synaesthetic, and described in 
great detail his personal perceptions of the written forms of vowels for a research project by 
his psychologist colleague Théodore Flournoy (Joseph 2012: 393-397). However, he knew 
that his synaesthetic reactions were not shared by other speakers. Individual responses to 
language are not insignificant; but if speakers know that pluit means “it rains” regardless of 
whether or not they hear a raindrop in the pl- of pluit;8 if they understand bien and rien, 
regardless of whether the -ien calls up for them the colour of new rope as it did for Saussure; 
then for the grammarian analysing the langue as a social signifying system, the essential 
thing is that these words signify, just as do words like livre “book”, where any iconic link 
between signifier and signified seems far-fetched. Saussure published two articles proposing 
that sound symbolism, operating at the level of parole, played a role in language change 
(Saussure 1877, 1912; see Joseph 2015). He was not dogmatically dismissive of iconicity, 
just scrupulous about assigning it to its proper place within the analysis. 
Meschonnic’s Point 8 is about synchrony and diachrony: 
8. also, for Saussure, diachrony and synchrony together are history, and structuralism 
taught that diachrony was history, in opposition to synchrony, the state of language[.]9 
                                                          
8 The example is from Saussure & Constantin (2005: 222). The editors of the Cours replaced this with the 
French examples glas “knell” and fouet “whip” (Saussure 1922 [1916]: 102). 
9 “8. aussi, chez Saussure, la diachronie et la synchronie sont ensemble l’histoire, et le structuralisme a enseigné 
que la diachronie était l’histoire, qu’on opposait à la synchronie, état de langue”. 
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One often reads that Saussure wanted to halt historical enquiry in favour of synchronic 
analysis. According to oxfordreference.com, he rebuked the “diachronic” linguistics of his 
time because it “ignored the (to him, more interesting and important) problem of how to 
account for the existence and operation of language itself”.10 Actually, he rebuked the 
historical linguistics of his time for not being the “diachronic” enterprise which he was the 
first to envision. All the work Saussure published in his lifetime was historical, as is nearly all 
the manuscript material he left behind. Even when he went out to mountain villages to collect 
dialect data, in the background was his desire to get information that would give clues to the 
historical development of the Indo-European language family. The diachronic linguistics he 
advocated, far from being in opposition to synchronic analysis, took it as its first stage. His 
methodological objection was against imagining that individual sounds and forms have a 
continuous existence that can be traced from Proto-Indo-European to Latin to French. This is 
to misunderstand the nature of language as a system in which, at any given point in time, the 
value of any element is a function of its relationship to other elements with which it shares an 
associative or syntagmatic axis. 
Meschonnic’s final point is about continuity within language: 
9.  with the result that Saussure thinks the continuity of language and criticises the 
traditional divisions (lexicon, morphology, syntax), whereas structuralism was the 
triumphalism of a scientism of the discontinuous, following the dichotomies of the 
sign.11 
We can add phonology to the list: even such basic traditional divisions as consonant and 
vowel were rethought from the ground up by Saussure, who treated them as functions that 
                                                          
10 http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803100547367 
11 “9. si bien que Saussure pense le continu du langage et critique les divisions traditionnelles (lexique, 
morphologie, syntaxe), alors que le structuralisme a été le triomphalisme d’un scientisme du discontinu, selon 
les dichotomies du signe”. On the “continuous” in Meschonnic see Joseph (in press a). 
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any sound could fulfil (see Joseph in press b), while also reconceiving phonology as being of 
the same psychological nature as the other divisions. 
I shall add one further point of my own to Meschonnic’s list: 
10. Structuralism insists that language is fundamentally either social or psychological, 
with the other as secondary; whereas for Saussure it is fundamentally both. 
 Saussure referred to himself as a grammarian, and was scrupulous about not pronouncing on 
matters beyond the limits of his expertise. His silences are sometimes interpreted as 
dogmatically excluding various things from language, when in fact his position is that they 
may well have a significant role to play, but that these are matters for psychologists or 
physiognomists or philosophers to give their expert opinion on, since the grammarian can 
only speak authoritatively about the internal workings of language as a system of values, put 
into practice in speech.  
Saussure’s first course in general linguistics of 1907 contains considerable material on 
analogy as a psychological process involving unconscious or demi-unconscious thought. This 
material steadily decreases as his emphasis on the social nature of langue grows. A balance is 
reached whereby a langue 
is a trésor deposited by the practice of parole in the subjects belonging to one same 
community, a grammatical system existing virtually in each brain, or more exactly in 
the brains of an ensemble of individuals; for the language is not complete in anyone, it 
exists perfectly only in the mass.12 
If this joint psychological-social existence is paradoxical, it nevertheless anticipates present-
day views about distributed cognition (see Joseph 2018). This makes it unsustainable to 
                                                          
12  CLG 2 30: “C’est un trésor déposé par la pratique de la parole dans les sujets appartenant à une même 
communauté, un système grammatical existant virtuellement dans chaque cerveau, ou plus exactement dans les 
cerveaux d’un ensemble d’individus; car la langue n’est complète dans aucun, elle n’existe parfaitement que 
dans la masse”. See also Joseph (2016).  
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depict Saussure, as some do, as being dogmatically committed either to a social or a 
psychological stance. 
The Saussurean system is sometimes called abstract, in a sense which implies that it is 
neither social nor psychological but exists in a Platonic heaven. This is understandable given 
how it is founded on values based on difference, rather than on sounds or meanings in the 
usual sense. The signifier is not sound, and the signified is not a thing.13 But Saussure was 
concerned with ensuring that his linguistic analyses were solidly grounded in what is 
psychologically real for speakers, and disdainful of what were for him the misguided abstract 
analyses of linguists. 
I shall close with a case where Saussure really was dogmatic, for comparison’s sake, 
and to reassure readers (and myself) that I am not idealising him. The Cours treats writing as 
not being language, just a secondary representation of it – which, as Derrida (1967) showed, 
connects Saussure to a long tradition of thought going back to Plato. In the first course on 
general linguistics of 1907, Saussure banished writing from consideration on the grounds that 
it is the source of illusions, spelling pronunciations, which distort the real operation of 
language and its transmission over time. In the third course of 1910-11, he appears to soften 
his position, treating writing and spoken language as two different modes of “executing” a 
langue, at the level of parole: “the only change would be the replacement of the acoustic 
images I mentioned by visual images”.14 This is surprising: he has been describing signifiers 
                                                          
13 As discussed in Joseph (2017), one of the more confusing choices made by the editors of the Cours was to 
include a picture of a tree as the signified in one of the diagrams illustrating the linguistic sign. It reinforced the 
common understanding that Saussure was trying to fight against, a “nomenclaturism” that takes a language to be 
a set of labels for things that exist in the world, or exist conceptually independent of their naming. Instead, 
Saussure taught, signifiers and signifieds come into existence jointly and simultaneously. If sapling or hogget 
existed as categories in nature, one would expect many more languages to have words for them. The signifying 
value of tree is a function of its difference from sapling, shrub and other similar plants. As for the signifier, the 
range of phonetic variants is by definition constrained only by its attachment to the signified: if it does not 
signify the signified, it is not a signifier. The signifying takes place in the mind of the hearer, where the sound 
perceived has to be compatible with a category – the phoneme – that Saussure sometimes describes as an 
acoustic image, though ultimately all signifiers, and all signifieds, are values.  
14 “En cela il [Whitney] suivait la voie juste; il est d’accord avec nos idées … C’était juste car il faisait bon 
marché de l’exécution. Cela revient à ce que nous disions: le seul changement c’est que les images acoustiques 
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as acoustic images, and this would seem to involve a fundamental change in their nature. But 
already in the second course of 1908-9 he focussed on langue as a system of pure values 
generated by difference; and if the signifier is in the end a value, it should be realisable in 
different modes. Yet in the third course he still treats writing as a mirage producing “deviant” 
developments where spelling affected pronunciation in the history of French. He calls them 
“monstrosities” and characterises their study as “teratology”,15 terms that make his rejection 
of writing as being, not language, just a secondary representation of language, sound all the 
more dogmatic. He could reconcile speech and writing in synchronic systems, but not in their 
diachronic development, where spoken means real, and writing distorts.  
Daylight (2011) has made a good case for rescuing Saussure from the contradictions 
which, Derrida argued, Saussure’s rejection of writing poses for other aspects of his 
conception of language; but even if this is right, the dogmatism does not disappear. This was 
a point that hit close to home for Saussure, since Genève is the result of a spelling 
pronunciation (cf. German Genf), and Genthod, where his family’s summer home was 
located, traditionally pronounced Genthou, was increasingly being pronounced instead the 
way it “looked” from its spelling, which upset Saussure.16 And spelling upset was a family 
trait: his uncle Théodore, who was like a second father to him, even published a book entitled 
Étude de la langue française: De l’orthographe des noms propres et des mots étrangers 
introduits dans la langue (1885), concerned, as the subtitle states, with “the spelling of proper 
names and foreign words introduced into the language”. That was not Ferdinand’s worry. 
Rather, he had enough Neogrammarian instincts from his Leipzig years to want to believe in 
the purity of linguistic evolution, and as a scholar of ancient languages who depended on 
written texts as his data source, he needed to trust them as accurate records of the language of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
dont nous parlions seraient remplacées par des images visuelles” (Constantin’s notes, in Saussure & Constantin 
2005: 88). 
15 CLG/E 88-89. 
16 The old pronunciation is today entirely forgotten except by historians. 
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their time, rather than as agents driving change in those languages, as he was hearing happen 
around him. But his doctrinaire dismissal of writing was exceptional and made for a bad fit 
within his conception of language, as Derrida detected. 
I claim no unique understanding of Saussure, such that anyone who disagrees with me 
has foolishly misread him. If they emerge from their reading with a Saussure that works for 
them, that is not to be discounted. People open the Cours for a reason, generally involving 
some concept, model or technique they or their teachers are promoting or contesting or just 
striving to understand. Theirs, like mine, will always be a partial Saussure, in both senses of 
the word. That is inevitable. The job of those of us who make Saussure one of our 
specialisms is to help guide them toward our best understanding of his teaching, when what 
they seek is a textually authentic Saussure, whether the authenticity is to the Cours, its source 
materials or earlier abandoned manuscripts. We would though be like King Cnut trying to 
stop the tide were we to insist that our reading, however well-documented, is the sole 
legitimate one. To maintain otherwise would be dogmatic. 
  The strongest evidence for a non-dogmatic reading of Saussure is that, in the end, he 
was never quite certain enough to publish the book on language which he had been working 
on in one form or another for 35 years. Others had to pin down the text; and once committed 
to the page, any text is open to being read as definitive, even if its author’s intention was to 
wonder, and wander, eternally. 
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